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a natural generalization of, and further identical to, the conventional stability for matching
without couples. It is shown that there always exists a semi-stable matching for couples
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matching is stable when couples play reservation strategies. This result perfectly explains
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tent Improvement Algorithm, for nding semi-stable matchings, which is also more ecient
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the matching problem with couples. One typical feature of the problem
is that stable matchings may not exist in the presence of couples. To avoid this defect and nd
sucient conditions for the existence of stable matchings, we dene the notion of semi-stability
as a generalized solution for matching problem with couples, which is a relaxation and natural
generalization of the conventional stability, and is further identical to the conventional stability
for matching without couples.
Matching is one of the most important natures of market. Many problems, such as trade
problem in consumption goods markets, employment problem in labor markets and auction
problem of indivisible/public goods, etc., can be regarded as matching problems. Gale and
Shapley (1962) were the rst to introduce the notion of stable matching and regarded it as a
solution of matching problem. The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by them reveals that
a stable matching always exists in one-to-one matching markets with strict preferences. Since
then, a lot of important theoretical results and their practice on matching have been developed
in key areas including education, health care, and army program such as the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP) for medical students; student assignment mechanisms in major
school districts; kidney exchange programs; army programs, etc.
The NRMP has a long history. The original algorithm for NRMP proposed by Mullen and
Stalnaker (1952) was an unstable mechanism, and later, it was revised repeatedly as discussed in
detail in Roth and Peranson (1999). One of the reasons is that, since the 1970s, more and more
female medical students had entered the job market, which made NRMP's algorithm run into
diculties in nding stable outcomes. For instance, couples would often decline the job oers
assigned by the clearinghouse and search positions themselves in order to stay together, say, they
would prefer to have jobs in the same city, although the choice may not be the best for their
professional development. This implies that couple students' preferences are complements. In
order to make the NRMP's algorithm also work for couple medical students, Roth and Peranson
(1999) designed the NRMP's present algorithm, but it may result in an empty set of stable
matchings since stable matching may not exist at all.
Sun and Yang (2006, 2009) studied the auction problem in economies where agents of the
same type are substitutes for one another, but agents of dierent types are complements. They
showed that equilibrium always exists in economies with quasi-linear preferences. Ostrovsky
(2008) studied a more generalized problem of supply chain networks in which there are similar
restrictions|same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity, and showed that the
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set of chain-stable networks is non-empty. The problem of matching with couples, however, is
dierent from that of cross-side complementarity in that agents of same-couple are complements.
Ronn (1990) demonstrated that when couple factors in preferences are taken into account, it
is an NP-complete problem to show whether there exist stable matchings by computational
methods.1
As Kojima et al. (2013) pointed out, although there may not exist any stable matching in
couples markets, market practice in the past two decades indicated that the NRMP's present al-
gorithm rarely failed for the clearinghouse to nd stable matchings.2 Why can the clearinghouse
nd stable outcomes while the theories indicate that there may not exist any stable outcomes for
couples markets? Kojima et al. (2013) regarded it as a puzzle and the reason may be that there
are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size. They
showed that under some regularity conditions, as the size of market tends to innity whereas
the number of couples relative to the size of market does not grow rapidly, the probability that
there exists a stable matching tends to 1. However, this is just an asymptotic result and a one
based on probability bounds. Indeed, any particular market in practice has only a nite number
of market participants and the probability that a stable matching exists is not guaranteed to
reach 1 in any nite market. As such, this asymptotic prediction is not directly applicable to
any nite economy.
In their attempt to nd a generalized solution for the matching problem with couples, Klijn
and Masso (2003) introduced the notion of weakly stable matching3 in order to extend the
existence result to a larger class of preferences. For singles markets, they showed that the set
of weakly stable and weakly ecient matchings is identical to Zhou's (1994) bargaining set.
However, as Klaus and Klijn (2005) indicated, the set of weakly stable matchings may still be
empty in matching markets with couples. A question is then under what conditions there exist
stable matchings in a matching market with couples. Klaus and Klijn (2005) showed that a
stable matching exists if all couples' preferences are (weakly) responsive, which means that the
unilateral improvement of one partner's acceptable job is considered benecial for the couple as
well, and thus it reects situations where couples search for jobs in the same metropolitan area.
1The abbreviation NP refers to nondeterministic polynomial time, which is a common term in computational
complexity theory.
2The NRMP's present algorithm proposed by Roth and Peranson (1999) is an adjustment of the instability-
chaining algorithm for singles markets, which was proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990), so that the revised
matching system can accept couples' preferences.
3A matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and all blocking coalitions are dominated. The
detailed denition can be seen in Klijn and Masso (2003), Klaus and Klijn (2005).
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As a result, (weak) responsiveness essentially excludes complementarities in couples' preferences.
When couples' preferences are not (weakly) responsive, Klaus and Klijn4 showed that stable
outcomes may not exist even in the system containing only one couple. Thus, their result is
limited in application.
Moreover, Aldershof and Carducci (1996) showed that, for couples markets, even when the
set of stable matchings is non-empty, there may not be a lattice structure, the set of unmatched
objects may not be the same at every stable matching, and further there may not be any optimal
stable matchings. Klaus and Klijn (2005) demonstrated that there are not any ready parallels
to any of the standard results in marriage matching markets, even if preferences are responsive.
All in all, there has been no satisfactory result so far to the problem of matching with
couples. There is neither any concept of outcome that is generally applicable, nor any generalized
algorithm applicable to couples markets for general settings.
In this paper we dene a notion of semi-stability that can be seen as a generalized solution
of the matching problem with couples, and show that there always exists a semi-stable matching
for couples markets with strict preferences. Semi-stable matching means that it is individually
rational and there does not exist any blocking coalition of the matching that contains singleton,
that is, a blocking coalition of a semi-stable matching, if any, contains a real couple. As such,
the set of stable matchings is clearly a subset of semi-stable matchings. For a special singles
market, a semi-stable matching is identical to a stable matching. Thus, the notion of semi-stable
matching is a natural generalization of the conventional stable matching without couples. The
Persistent Improvement Algorithm (PI-Algorithm in short) proposed in the paper reveals that
semi-stable matching always exists in matching markets with couples and strict preferences.
We then provide sucient conditions for the existence of stable matchings for couples markets
even with complementary preferences. It is shown that there exists a stable matching with
couples provided every real couple plays reservation strategies, i.e., some reservation preference
of couples, which can secure a pair of jobs if they want, are placed on top of their rank lists
of preferences. The notion of reservation preference is similar to the conventional reservation
utility of an individual: a utility a person can surely obtain. When a couple plays reservation
strategies, like individuals' preferences in game theory, mechanism design, auction theory, and
market design, their preferences depend not only on their own choice but also on the choice of
jobs of hospitals. The reason why couples play reservation strategies is that their preferences
have couple-complementarity, that is, although popular jobs are personally desirable, the pair
4The counterexample is seen in Roth (2008), but it belongs to Klaus and Klijn.
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of popular jobs may not be the most preferred choice for couples, as they may not be at the
same hospital or in the same city. In order to stay together, the most preferred pair of jobs may
not be popular jobs, which is consistent with the practice of NRMP. As a consequence of the
suciency results, we provide a new explanation for the puzzle of NRMP raised in Kojima et
al. (2013). Moreover, these results perfectly explain the puzzle even for nite market because
they are not based on probability bounds and can be directly applicable to any nite economy.
This paper also denes a notion of asymptotic stability. In a large couples market, if the
number of couples is suciently small relative to that of singles, a semi-stable matching can
be deemed as an approaching stable matching. The number of blocking coalitions of any semi-
stable matching must be very small relative to the size of the market, if the length of rank list
of couples' preferences does not quickly increase as the market goes very large. We dene the
notion of the degree of unstable matching to indicate the unorderly degree of a matching. The
degree of instability is 0 for a stable matching, and 1 for the null matching in which all players
are unmatched. It is shown that under some simple regularity conditions, couples markets are
asymptotically stable, i.e., there exists a matching sequence whose instability degree sequence
tends to zero when the size of market tends to innity. This conclusion is similar to the result
in Kojima et al. (2013), who demonstrated that the probability that a stable matching exists
converges to 1 as the market size approaches innity under some regularity conditions. The
simple regularity conditions dened in this paper, however, are weaker than their regularity
conditions. As such, their result can be regarded as a special case of our result.
Another important contribution of the paper is to provide an algorithm called Persistent
Improvement Algorithm (PI-Algorithm in short) for nding a semi-stable matching, which is
also more ecient than the Gale-Shapley algorithm in the sense that it is quicker to nd a
stable marching for singles markets. Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford
(1982) studied the employment problem in labor markets, and generalized the Gale-Shapley
algorithm by introducing the salary adjustment process. Hateld and Milgrom (2005) extended
the Gale-Shapley algorithm into a generalized algorithm for matching with contracts, which
is in turn a generalization of the salary adjustment process of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
Ostrovsky (2008) studied a more generalized problem about supply chain networks in which
there are restrictions|same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity, and presented
the T-Algorithm which generalizes the algorithms in Kelso and Crawford (1982), Hateld and
Milgrom (2005), as well as the Gale-Shapley algorithm for marriage matching. However, the
problem of matching with couples is dierent from that of cross-side complementarity in that
5
agents of same-couple are complements. Those algorithms mentioned above cannot t into the
couples markets. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) presented the instability-chaining algorithm for
one-to-one matching markets. The NRMP's present algorithm proposed in Roth and Peranson
(1999) is an improvement of the instability-chaining algorithm for singles markets such that
the clearinghouse can accept the preferences of couples, but the algorithm may not converge.
This paper presents the PI-Algorithm which ts the couples markets. Moreover, it improves the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, through which we can nd a stable matching quickly and which must
end in nite rounds for singles markets.
We also show that the set of semi-stable matchings can be partitioned into subsets, each of
which forms a distributive lattice, and in each of which there exist optimal semi-stable matchings
for couples side, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for hospitals side, and the set of unmatched
objects is the same at every semi-stable matching. We study welfare property and incentive
issues of semi-stable matching mechanisms from the perspective of market design, and generalize
respective results in marriage matching markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the setup and
introduces the notion of semi-stability in couples matchings. Section III provides the main results
on the existence of semi-stable matchings, stable matchings, asymptotically stable matching
sequence, and a generalized lattice theorem. We also provide a new explanation for the NRMP
puzzle. Section IV presents the PI-Algorithm and its properties. Section V discusses the welfare
and incentive properties of semi-stable matching mechanisms from the perspective of market
design. Section VI concludes and the appendix gives proofs of theorems.
2 A General Setting of Matching with Couples
To study matching with couples, without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to a matching
market that consists of jobs of hospitals, job-seeking medical students and their preferences.
Although a hospital may provide many jobs, yet as Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) pointed out, when medical students' preferences are on specic jobs, it is
equivalent to the one-to-one marriage matching market. In fact, a hospital may provide some
jobs of special profession, such as physician jobs, surgeon jobs or gynecologist jobs, etc., and
the requirements for the jobs are generally dierent. As such, in this paper, matching objects
of medical students are jobs rather than hospitals.
Let H denote the set of jobs of hospitals, S the set of medical students and C the set of
student couples. Their elements are written as h, s, and c = (s; s0) respectively. For convenience
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of discussion, we assume that null outcome is an element of sets H and S and a couple with
null partner is an element of C. To save notation, here we abuse  to have denoted the null
elements/partner of sets H, S, and C. Specically, null  in H (resp. S) denotes the outside
option for doctors (resp. jobs), and c = (s; ) in C denotes a special couple|single student. As
such, the model in this paper can actually be applied to two markets, i.e., the market containing
singles only, in short, singles market; the market containing couples (may containing singles or
not), in short, couples market.
We assume that all preferences of jobs and couples are strict. Let h and c denote h's and
c's preference relation, and P h and P c denote h's and c's preference list over students and pairs
of jobs, respectively. It is said that a student s 2 S is acceptable (resp. unacceptable) to h if
s h  (resp.  h s), and (h; h0) 2 H2 is acceptable (resp. unacceptable) pair of jobs to c if
(h; h0) c (; ) (resp. (; ) c (h; h0)). For convenience of discussion, we assume that  and
(; ) are at the last in P h and P c respectively. Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) denote a
couples market.
A matching  is a one-to-one idempotent function from the set H [ S onto itself (i.e.,
2(x) = x for all x) such that (s) 2 H and (h) 2 S, where (s) and (h) are the matched
objects of s and h in . When a medical student or a job is not matched in ,  is regarded
as its matched object. For convenience, we assume () = . Let (c) = ((s); (s0)) with
(s) 2 H and (s0) 2 H. For any , (s) = h if and only if (h) = s; (c) = (h; h0) if and only
if (h) = s and (h0) = s0.
If a job or a couple cannot be improved upon by voluntarily abandoning its matched object,
the matching is individually rational. Formally,
Denition 2.1 A matching  is individually rational if (i) for all h 2 H with (h) 6= ,
(h) h ; and (ii) for all c = (s; s0) 2 C, (c) c (; (s0)) when (s) 6= , (c) c ((s); )
when (s0) 6= , and (c) c (; ) when (c) 6= (; ).
A couple and a pair of hospital jobs constitute a coalition. We then have the following
denitions.
Denition 2.2 f(s; s0); (h; h0)g 2 C  H2 is called a blocking coalition of matching  if (i)
(h; h0) c (c); and (ii) [h 6=  and (h) 6= s imply s h (h)] and [h0 6=  and (h0) 6= s0 imply
s0 h0 (h0)].
Thus, a blocking coalition means that agents can be improved upon by matching with each
other.
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Denition 2.3 A matching is said to be stable if it is individually rational and there exist no
blocking coalitions.
Denition 2.4 A matching is said to be semi-stable if it is individually rational and there are
no blocking coalitions containing a single.
It is obvious that a stable matching is semi-stable, but the reverse in general is not true.
However, a semi-stable matching is a stable matching for any singles market. Indeed, when all
couples are (s; ), it is identical to the denition of stable matching for singles markets. Thus,
the notion of semi-stability for couples markets is a natural generalization of the conventional
stability for singles markets. As Gale and Shapley (1962) showed, a stable matching always
exists for singles markets with strict preferences. However, for couples markets, Roth (1984)
showed that there may not exist any stable matching. In the next section, departing from Roth's
example, we show that a semi-stable matching always exists for any couples market with strict
preferences and also provide sucient conditions for the existence of stable matchings.
3 Main Existence Results and NRMP Puzzle Revisited
In this section, we rst investigate the existence of semi-stable matching for couples markets
with strict preferences. We then show that the set of semi-stable matchings can be partitioned
into subsets, each of which forms a distributive lattice so that the couple-optimal matching exists
on each of partition sets. We also provide sucient conditions for the existence of stability. The
results enable us to provide a new explanation for the puzzle of NRMP raised in Kojima et al.
(2013). Moreover, we dene a notion of asymptotic stability and provide sucient conditions
for a matching sequence to be asymptotically stable.
3.1 Existence of Semi-Stable Matching and Distributive Lattice
The example in Klaus and Klijn (2005) shows that, even if there is only one couple in a
matching market, there may not exist any stable matching. As such, if one focuses only on
stable matchings, the set of outcomes may be empty. This makes us introduce the notion
of semi-stable matching, which means that there does not exist any blocking coalition of the
matching that contains a single. A question is then whether there exists a semi-stable matching
for a couples market. The following theorem gives an armative answer.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of Semi-Stable Matching) For any couples market   = (H;S;C;
(h)h2H ; (c)c2C) with strict preferences, there exists a semi-stable matching .
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The theorem indicates that a semi-stable matching always exists for strict preferences. Since
the theorem is proved by a constructive way, we actually obtain an algorithm to nd a semi-
stable outcome. In addition, the algorithm also provides an approach to nd a stable matching,
if any, in couples markets. Indeed, we rst nd a semi-stable matching, and then see if the
semi-stable matching is stable by verifying that there is no blocking coalition containing a real
couple. Of course, this is only a sucient condition for stable matching, that is, if the semi-stable
matching is not stable, we cannot assert that there do not exist any stable matchings.
The Conway lattice theorem in the literature shows that the set of all stable matchings forms
a distributive lattice for a singles market with strict preferences so that there is a polarization
of interests between the two sides of the market along the set of stable matchings.5 This implies
that there exists a unique best stable matching S favored by the students and a unique best
stable matching H favored by the hospitals. Despite this nice property, Aldershof and Carducci
(1996) and Klaus and Klijin (2005) showed that, for couples markets, even when the set of stable
matchings is non-empty, there may be no optimal matching for either side of the market even
for the responsive preferences.
Can we have a similar result of this nice property for semi-stable matchings with couples?
The answer is armative in some sense. In any couples market with strict preferences, there
is a partition of the set of semi-stable matchings, each section of which forms a distributive
lattice. To show this, dene two partial ordering relations C and H on matchings as follows.
For any two matchings 1 and 2, 1 C 2 (resp. 1 H 2) if and only if 1(c) c 2(c)
or 1(c) = 2(c) (resp. 1(h) h 2(h) or 1(h) = 2(h)) for every c 2 C (resp. h 2 H).
It is easily seen that both C and H are partial ordering relations, i.e., they are irreexive,
anti-symmetric and transitive.
Consider a couples market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C). Let F be the set of all semi-
stable matchings, and 1 and 2 be two semi-stable matchings in F . We dene two functions
_C and ^C that assign to each student his/her more preferred and less preferred match from 1
and 2, respectively. Formally, dene two operators _C and ^C as follows: for any c 2 C
and 1; 2 2 F , let  = 1 _C 2 and  = 1 ^C 2 where (c) = maxcf1(c); 2(c)g,
(c) = mincf1(c); 2(c)g. Similarly, we can dene functions _H and ^H . We then have
the following generalized lattice theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Generalized Lattice Theorem) Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a
5The theorem is seen in Knuth (1976) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990), but it belongs to John Conway. A
lattice is a partially ordered set in which every two elements have a supremum and an inmum. A lattice is called
a distributive lattice if it also satises the law of distributivity.
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couples market with strict preferences. Then the set of all semi-stable matchings F can be
partitioned into subsets Fi (i = 1; : : : ;m) with [mi=1Fi = F and Fi \Fj = ; (j 6= i) such that for
any two semi-stable matchings 1 and 2 in Fi, 1 _C 2 = 1 ^H 2 and 1 ^C 2 = 1 _H 2
are semi-stable matchings. Furthermore, each of them forms a distributive lattice for operations
_C and ^C (resp. _H and ^H).
The above Generalized Lattice Theorem implies that in each subset of the partition, there
exists a unique best semi-stable matching C (called the student-optimal semi-stable matching)
favored by the couples, which is the worst semi-stable matching for the hospital jobs, and there
exists a unique worst semi-stable matching for the couples H (called the hospital-optimal semi-
stable matching) favored by the hospital jobs, which is the best semi-stable matching for the
hospital jobs.6
For a singles market, the set of all semi-stable matchings is identical to the set of all stable
matchings. As a corollary, the above theorem covers the Conway lattice theorem for marriage
matching markets as a special case.
Corollary 3.1 (Conway Lattice Theorem) If all preferences are strict, then the set of all
stable matchings in marriage matching markets forms a lattice for partial ordering relation.
3.2 Sucient Condition for the Existence of Stable Matching
For a couples market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), under what conditions does there exist
a stable matching? Klaus and Klijn (2005) provided an answer by introducing the notion of
(weakly) responsive preference7, and showed that relative personal preferences can be induced
from the preference of couple when it is (weakly) responsive, and these personal preferences
induced must be unique. In such situations, the stable matchings found by the Gale-Shapley
algorithm are also stable in couple context.
However, (weakly) responsive preference implies that there is no complementarity for pref-
erences of couple, but in real world, they are generally complementary. For example, although
6In fact, supposing that there are m semi-stable matchings in the subset, then we can easily see that C 
1_C 2_C   _C m and H  1^C 2^C   ^C m are respectively the best and worst semi-stable matching for
couples and hospital jobs in the subset. The argument can be seen in the remark after the proof of the Generalized
Lattice Theorem in Appendix.
7The preference of couple c = (s; s0) 2 C is (weakly) responsive if there exist single preferences s and s0
such that: 1) for all h 2 H, (h; ) c (; ) if and only if h s ; (; h) c (; ) if and only if h s0 ; and 2)
for all hp; hq; hr 2 H, if hq s0 , hp s hr s , then (hp; hq) c (hr; hq); if hq s , hp s0 hr s0 , then
(hq; hp) c (hq; hr).
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for an individual s, hp s hr, yet for couple c = (s; s0) 2 C, (hr;hq) c (hp; hq), as hq and hr
are in Boston whereas hp is in New York. Thus, the preference of the couple c is not (weakly)
responsive. If so, there may not exist any stable outcomes even in markets containing only one
couple.
In this subsection, we provide a sucient condition for the existence of stable matching
even in the presence of complementary preferences of couples. To do so, we rst introduce the
following notion.
Denition 3.1 (Reservation Preference) A pair of jobs (h; h0) 2 H2 is said to be a reser-
vation preference job pair of a couple c = (s; s0) 2 C if (i) (h; h0) c (; ), (ii) whenever h 6= ,
s h es for all es 2 P hnfsg, and (iii) whenever h0 6= , s0 h0 es0 for all es0 2 P h0nfs0g.
A reservation preference of a couple means that the couple can get a pair of jobs if they
want, as the members of the couple are respectively the most preferred medical students for the
relevant jobs of hospitals. It may be remarked that, when a couple plays reservation strategies,
like individuals' preferences in game theory, mechanism design, auction theory, and market
design, their preferences depend not only on their own choice but also on the choice of jobs of
hospitals. The notion of reservation preference is also similar to the conventional reservation
utility of an individual. While reservation utility is a utility that a person can surely obtain by
outside opportunities and in turn may depend on preferences of other individuals, reservation
preference means that the couple can surely get the jobs since the couple is most preferred
students to the jobs.
We then have the following theorem which shows that there must exist a stable matching if
the rst preference of each couple is one of its reservation preferences.
Theorem 3.3 (Sucient Condition I for the Existence of Stable Matching) Let   =
(H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences. Suppose that for all
c 2 C with s; s0 6= , the rst preference job pair (h; h0) in P c is a reservation preference job
pair of c. Then, there exists a stable matching .
The reason why a reservation preference job pair may be the rst priority of a real couple
is that its preferences have couple-complementarity, that is, although one wants some popular
jobs, the pair of popular jobs may not be the most preferred choice for couples. Since the pair
of popular jobs may not be at the same hospital or in the same city, the most preferred job
pair for a couple may not be popular jobs, but may be its reservation preference job pair. In
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the later subsection, we will give a generalized version of the theorem with more slack condition
that reservation preference job pair of real couples may not be their rst preference job pair.
3.3 Asymptotic Stability
If we regard stable matching as orderly matching whereas unstable matching as unorderly
matching, then the degree of an unstable matching may be used to measure the unorderly
degree of a matching. For a couples market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), the most unorderly
matching is the null matching 0, i.e., for any c 2 C, 0(c) = (; ), whose instability degree is
denoted by 1. The most orderly matchings are stable matchings. For any stable matching 1,
its instability degree is denoted by 0. As such, for a matching , its instability degree is a real
number between 0 and 1. The intuition is that the higher the instability degree of a matching
is, the more unorderly the matching is.
Denition 3.2 (Eective Preference) A pair of jobs (h; h0) 2 H2 is said to be an eective
preference job pair of a couple c if (i) (h; h0) c (; ), (ii) s h  whenever h 6= , and (iii)
s0 h0  whenever h0 6= . Student s is said to be an eective preference student of h if (i) s h 
and (ii) there exists h 2 H such that (h; h) c (; ). Student s0 as h0's eective preference
student can be similarly dened.
If jobs in a couple c's preference list can accept its corresponding members, then the couple's
preference job pair is an eective preference job pair to the couple. If (h; h0) is not an eective
preference job pair of c, then there does not exist any individually rational matching  such that
(c) = (h; h0). Similarly, if s is not an eective preference student of h, there does not exist any
individually rational matching  such that (h) = s.
Denition 3.3 If the set C contains n elements, the preference list P ci contains li eective
preference job pairs and the number of blocking coalitions of matching  ism, then the instability
degree of  is denoted by () = m=N , where N =
Pn
i=1 li.
Denition 3.3 implies that instability degree is a function from the set of all the matchings
in matching market   onto the unit interval. The null matching 0 has N =
Pn
i=1 li blocking
coalitions8 and each stable matching 1 has no blocking coalition, so (0) = 1 and (1) = 0.
8Each blocking coalition fc; (h; h0)g of the null matching 0 contains a couple and one of its eective preference
job pairs; conversely, for any c 2 C and any job pair (h; h0) of its eective preference job pairs, fc; (h; h0)g must
be a blocking coalition of the null matching 0. Thus, the null matching 0 has exactly N =
Pn
i=1 li blocking
coalitions.
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Thus, for any matching , if it has m blocking coalitions, obviously 0  m  N , and thus the
degree of instability () 2 [0; 1]. Intuitively, the more blocking coalitions a matching has, the
more unorderly it is. Thus, the lower the instability degree of a matching is, the more orderly
and stable it is.
Denition 3.4 Let f kg1k=1 be a sequence of couples markets with  k = (Hk; Sk; Ck; (h
)h2Hk ; (c)c2Ck), and let k be a matching of  k, k = 1; 2;    . The matching sequence fkg1k=1
is said to be asymptotically stable if limk!1f(k)g1k=1 = 0. f kg1k=1 is said to be asymptotically
stable if there exists a matching sequence fkg1k=1 that is asymptotically stable.
Based on some common features of large matching markets in reality, Kojima and Pathak
(2009) rst presented the notion of regular markets. Kojima et al. (2013) then dened the regular
markets for couples matchings, and demonstrated that for a regular sequence of couples markets,
the probability that a stable matching exists converges to 1 as the market size approaches innity
whereas the number of couples relative to the market size does not grow rapidly.
Here we dene the notion of simple regular couples markets. Consider a sequence of markets
of dierent sizes. For a sequence of couples markets, f kg1k=1 with  k = (Hk; Sk; Ck; (h
)h2Hk ; (c)c2Ck), there are
Ck = nk, mk real couples, and lc eective preference job pairs in
P c.
Denition 3.5 A sequence of markets f kg1k=1 is said to be simple regular if it satises the
following conditions:
(1) mk  nk1  for all k and a small positive ;
(2) For any c 2 C with s0 6= , lc  (lnnk), where  and  are constants;
(3) (Participation Constraint) For any c 2 C, lc > 0.
Condition (1) implies the fact that the number of real couples is small relative to the number
of singles. Condition (2) requires that the number of eective preference job pairs of real couples
be very small relative to the number of possible pairs of jobs. Condition (3) is actually a
participation constraint. For any couple c, if lc = 0, then for any individually rational matching
, (c) = (; ), so it will not participate in the matching market. We then have the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (Asymptotic Stability) Suppose that f kg1k=1 is a sequence of simple regular
couples markets with strict preferences where  k = (Hk; Sk; Ck; (h)h2Hk ; (c)c2Ck). Then
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there exists a matching sequence fkg1k=1 that is asymptotically stable when nk tends to innity,
that is, f kg1k=1 is asymptotically stable.
The theorem indicates that there almost always exists a stable matching when the size of
a simple regular market tends to innity. As the simple regularity conditions are weaker than
the regularity conditions proposed in Kojima et al. (2013), their result that the probability of
the existence of a stable matching converges to 1 as the market size approaches innity can be
regarded as a special case of the above asymptotic stability theorem.
3.4 NRMP Puzzle Revisited
In the past two decades, NRMP's practice has shown that the clearinghouse seldom fails to
nd a stable matching. Kojima et al. (2013) pointed out that it is a puzzle. In fact, the reason
is that the NRMP market has many special features, which are described as eight stylized facts
by them. Here are the rst four stylized facts.
Fact 1: Applicants who participate as couples constitute a small fraction of all participating
applicants.
Fact 2: The length of the rank order lists of applicants who are single or couples is small
relative to the number of possible programs.
Fact 3: The most popular programs are ranked as a top choice by a small number of appli-
cants.
Fact 4: A pair of internship programs ranked by doctors who participate as a couple tend
to be in the same region.
Kojima et al. (2013) pointed out that, in the data of NRMP during 1992-2009, applicants
who participated as couples are on average 4.4% of all applicants, the length of single applicants'
preference lists is on average about 7-9 programs, which is about 0.3% of the number of all
possible programs, and the length of couple applicants' rank lists is about 81 on average, which
is less than 3% of the number of all possible programs. Thus, both are small relative to the
number of possible programs.
Since a matching of which the instability degree is zero must be stable, the asymptotic
stability theorem indicates that there almost always exists a stable matching when the size of
simple regular markets approaches innity. Facts 1 and 2 imply that the NRMP's practice
satises the simple regularity conditions, so the asymptotic stability theorem, Theorem 3.4, is
a good interpretation for the puzzle of NRMP.
Considering the stylized Fact 3 of NRMP market, most of popular jobs are placed at the top
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of their preference rank lists by only a small number of medical students. This indicates that
the rst preference jobs of most students are not their most preferred choices. Why is this true?
It is because couple are complementary, and they want to stay in the same location. As such,
the pair of popular jobs may not be the most preferred choice for couples as they may not be at
the same hospital or in the same city. Fact 4 exactly describes this, which indicates that a pair
of internship programs ranked by doctors who participate as a couple tend to be in the same
region. Combining Facts 3 and 4, one can assess that real couples have more incentives to play
reservation strategies than singles, i.e., they place one of their reservation preference job pairs,
rather than popular jobs, at the top of their rank order list (ROL) of preferences. As a result,
by Theorem 3.3, there exists a stable matching. Thus, this theoretical result explains why the
clearinghouse seldom fails to nd a stable matching in NRMP's practice even if the market may
not be large.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Psychology Labor Market
Total
Mean length for
rank order list (ROL)
Geographic similarity
for preference
Single doctors 3010 7.6
] Regions ranked 2.5
Couples 19 81.2
] Regions ranked 3.9
Fraction of ROL where
members rank same region
73.4%
Notes: The data are from Kojima et al. (2013). This table reports descriptive information
from the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers match, averaged over
1999-2007. Single doctors' rank order lists consist of a ranking over hospital jobs, while couples'
indicate rankings over pairs of hospital jobs.
From the statistical data in Tables 1 and 2, we can see these facts are true. Table 1 indicates
that the fraction of rank order list where both members rank the same region, i.e., the preference
having couple-complementarity, is 73.4%, which coincides with Fact 4. It shows that the pair
of jobs having couple-complementarity surely provides the couple with extra welfare, so it gives
couples more incentives than singles to play reservation strategies. Real couples play reservation
strategies, which coincides with Fact 3 that the most popular programs are ranked as a top
choice by a small number of applicants. This actually shows that not only most real couples but
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also most singles play reservation strategies.
Intuitively, if the rst preference of a couple or single is successfully matched, then the
preference may be seen as one of its reservation preferences. The data in Table 2 show that the
fractions of the rst preferences of singles that are successfully matched are respectively 36.8%
and 36.0% in markets without couples and with couples. If the second preference of singles
that is successfully matched is also seen as their reservation preference, then the fractions of
singles that play reservation strategies are respectively 53.7% and 52.6%. Although the fraction
of the rst and second preferences9 of couples that are successfully matched is only 27.9% and
41.2% plus the third and fourth preferences, as couples have more incentives than singles to play
reservation strategies, we can conclude that there is a larger fraction of couples than 53.7% to
place their reservation preferences at the top of their rank order lists. It can be partly explained
by the fractions of couples and singles unassigned. On average, about 19.5% of all singles are
unassigned but only 5.1% for couples, that is, about 80.5% of all singles and 94.9% of all couples
are assigned. It may be interpreted as a larger fraction of couples than singles play reservation
strategies.10
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Psychology Labor Market
Matching Markets Doctor Type
Doctor's Choice Received
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th unassigned
without couples single 36.8% 16.9% 10.1% 6.1% 11.2% 18.9%
with couples
single 36.0% 16.6% 10.1% 6.2% 11.6% 19.5%
couple 18.0% 9.9% 8.2% 5.1% 53.7% 5.1%
Notes: The data are from Kojima et al. (2013). This table reports the fractions of preferences
of singles that are successfully matched in the doctor-optimal stable matching in a singles market
versus a couples market in the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers
match, averaged over 1999-2007. A doctor is counted as unassigned even if being unassigned is
among her top ve choices.
All in all, Facts 3 and 4 imply that the assumption that real couples play reservation strategies
is a very reasonable assumption, and thus Theorem 3.3 perfectly interprets the puzzle of NRMP
9Since the preference of couples is a pair of jobs, two jobs can constitute two preferences, such as (h1; h2) and
(h2; h1).
10Of course, it also has another interpretation that, originally, jobs h1 and h2 are not to be accepted by either
member of a couple, yet both jobs are at the same hospital or in the same city, so as a couple they may accept
the pairs of jobs (h1; h2) or (h2; h1). Thus, the probability that the couple is assigned is increased.
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because we need not impose the unrealistic assumption that market goes to innity and it is
not based on probability bounds. Theorem 3.3 holds even for nite market. In contrast, the
result of Kojima et al. (2013) is an asymptotic result that is based on probability bounds.
The probability that a stable matching exists is not guaranteed to reach 1 in any nite market.
Since any particular market in practice has only a nite number of market participants, their
asymptotic prediction is not directly applicable to any nite economy.
In fact, the condition of Theorem 3.3 can be further weakened. Provided the preferences in
front of real couples' rst reservation preferences are not pairs of popular jobs, then there exists
a stable matching. Since the number of couples is very small relative to the number of singles,
we may consider that all popular jobs are assigned to singles. The data in Table 1 show that the
number of singles is 3010 whereas the number of couples is 19, and the fraction of singles whose
rst preferences are successfully assigned is over 36% (which means more than 1000 jobs, and
we may consider that almost all popular jobs are among the 1000 jobs). The following theorem
shows that there exists a stable matching in such markets, which is another strong interpretation
for the puzzle of NRMP.
Theorem 3.5 (Sucient Condition II for the Existence of Stable Matching) Let   =
(H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences, and for any c 2 C with
s; s0 6= , let (h; h0) 2 H2 be the rst reservation preference in P c. If for any job pair (h; h0) 2 H2
before (h; h0) in the couple's preference list P c, h 6=  or h0 6=  is not only the rst preference
but also reservation preference job of a single, then there exists a stable matching.
It can be easily seen that, when the condition of Theorem 3.3 is met, the condition of
Theorem 3.5 must also be satised. Thus, Theorem 3.5 is a generalization of Theorem 3.3.
4 Persistent Improvement Algorithm (PI-Algorithm)
Hateld and Milgrom (2005) presented the generalized Gale-Shapley algorithm for matching
with contracts. Ostrovsky (2008) studied the more generalized problem about supply chain
networks with same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity. He presented the T-
Algorithm that generalizes the result of Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and also the Gale-Shapley
algorithm for one-to-one matching. However, the problem of matching with couples is dierent
from that of cross-side complementarity in that agents of same-couple are complements. As such,
these algorithms cannot be applied to couples markets. This section provides a new algorithm,
called PI-Algorithm, which can be not only used to nd a semi-stable matching according to
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the steps described in the proof of Theorem 3.1, but also more ecient than the Gale-Shapley
algorithm for nding stable matchings in singles markets.
4.1 The PI-Algorithm
Given a couples market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), let P h and P c be h's and c's
preference list. Similar to Hateld and Milgrom (2005), we denote the space of contract X =
(S H) [ fg and the space of contract pairs Z = X X, where  denotes null contract. For
convenience, we say that (s; ) and (; h) are both null contracts. A contract x = (s; h) 2 X
denotes a matching pair between a medical student s and a hospital job h, and a medical student
can sign only a contract with any given job. If a medical student (resp. a hospital job) does
not sign any contract with any hospital job (resp. any medical student), we say it signs a null
contract . That is, in any case, a medical student (resp. a hospital job) can sign a null contract
if he/she (resp. it) does not want to sign a contract with any hospital job (resp. any medical
student). A contract pair z = ((s; h); (s0; h0)) 2 Z denotes a group of matchings between a couple
c = (s; s0) and a pair of jobs (h; h0). The running steps of the PI-Algorithm are a sequential
process in which contracts are chosen by hospital jobs and couples.
Given that a set of contracts X 0 j X, a job h and a couple c will make their optimal
choices by their preference lists. Let Chh : 2
X ! X and Chc : 2X ! Z denote their best-
response mappings so that every subset X 0 of X corresponds to Chh(X 0) and Chc(X 0), which
are respectively a contract and a contract pair. If there is no better choice than vacancy for
h, h's choice is a null contract; otherwise, it is a contract between h and its most preferred
student. For couples' choices, it is a little more complicated. The couple c chooses an optimal
contract pair by its preference list which may contain two null contracts, a null contract or no
null contract. Formally, the best-response mappings Chh() and Chc() of hospital jobs and
couples are dened as follows:
Chh(X
0) =
8<:  if Ah = ;(s; h) otherwise ;
where Ah = fs : s h  and (s; h) 2 X 0g is the set of students acceptable to the job h and ;
denotes the empty set, and s = max h fs : (s; h) 2 X 0g is the maximal element in Ah.
For c = (s; s0), the best-response mapping Chc() of couples is given by
Chc(X
0) =
8<: (;) if Ac = ;((s; h); (s0; h0)) otherwise ;
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where Ac = f(h; h0) : (h; h0) c (; ) and ((s; h); (s0; h0)) 2 X 0  X 0g is the set of job pairs
acceptable to the couple c, and (h; h0) = max c f(h; h0) : ((s; h); (s0; h0)) 2 X 0  X 0g is the
maximal element in Ac. Specically, Chc(X
0) can be expressed as
Chc(X
0) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(;) if h =  and h0 = 
((s; h);) if h 6=  and h0 = 
(; (s0; h0)) if h =  and h0 6= 
((s; h); (s0; h0)) otherwise.
Denote by ChH(X
0) = fx 2 X : x = Chh(X 0); h 2 Hg the best-response set for all hospital
jobs and ChC(X
0) = fx 2 X : 9 x 2 X s:t: (x; x) = Chc(X 0) or (x; x) = Chc(X 0); c 2 Cg the
best-response set for all couples.
The PI-Algorithm starts from the initial matching 0 at which matched objects of all cou-
ples are (; ). After running each round, a new matching t is created, which is a Pareto
improvement on t 1 for all couples, i.e., all couples c weakly prefer t(c) to t 1(c) with at
least one couple strictly preferring t(c). The PI-Algorithm ends if there is no further Pareto
improvement for all couples.
Let Q = fP c1 ; P c2 ; :::; P cm; P h1 ; P h2 ; :::; P hn g be the prole of stated preference lists, one for
each couple and hospital job, where each P c and P h are couple's and job's preference lists.
After hospital jobs and couples have submitted their preference lists, all calculation of the
PI-Algorithm is executed by the clearinghouse. In round 0 of the PI-Algorithm, it produces
preference list P c(0) of each couple c so that all such items (h; h0) of P c will be removed whenever
s or s0 is unacceptable to job h or job h0 respectively. The PI-Algorithm consists of repeated
rounds of calculation. There are four steps in each round except round 0. Step 1 determines
preference list P c(t) of each couple c where all the items of P c(t   1) behind t 1(c) will be
removed. Step 2 determines the set of contracts X(t) for hospital jobs to make a choice. Step
3 determines the set of contracts Y (t) = ChH(X(t)), which is the result chosen by all hospital
jobs, for couples to make a choice. Step 4 determines the set of contracts Z(t) = ChC(Y (t))
which is the result chosen by all couples. All the contracts in Z(t) form a matching t in round
t. Running round-by-round calculation, when Z(t) = Z(t   1), the PI-Algorithm ends and all
the contracts in Z(t) form the last matching E . Formally, we have
Round 0, for all c 2 C, P c(0) = P c n f(h; h0) 2 P c : s =2 P h or s0 =2 P h0g, t = 1.
Round t, for all c 2 C,
Step 1: P c(t) = P c(t  1) n f(h; h0) 2 P c(t  1) : t 1(c) c (h; h0)g;
Step 2: X(t) = X1(t) [X2(t) where
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X1(t) = [c2Cf(s; h) 2 X : there exists h0 2 H such that (h; h0) 2 P c(t) n f(; )gg,
X2(t) = [c2Cf(s0; h0) 2 X : there exists h 2 H such that (h; h0) 2 P c(t) n f(; )gg;
Step 3: Y (t) = ChH(X(t));
Step 4: Z(t) = ChC(Y (t)), we obtain the matching t. If Z(t) = Z(t  1), then the
PI-Algorithm ends; else t = t+ 1 and it goes to Round t.
We will illustrate these steps of the PI-Algorithm by the following example.
4.2 The PI-Algorithm: An Example
Example 4.1 c1 = (s1; s2) and c2 = (s3; s4) are couples, c3 = (s5; ) and c4 = (s6; ) are
singles. There are ve hospital jobs h1; h2; h3; h4 and h5. Their preference lists are as follows:
c1 : f(h1; h2); (h3; h4); (h1; ); (h3; ); (; h2); (; h4); (; )g;
c2 : f(h1; h2); (h3; h5); (h1; ); (h3; ); (; h2); (; h5); (; )g;
c3 : f(h1; ); (h2; ); (h3; ); (h5; ); (; )g;
c4 : f(h1; ); (h2; ); (h3; ); (h4; ); (; )g;
h1 : fs1; s3; s5; g; h2 : fs2; s4; s6; g; h3 : fs1; s3; s5; g;
h4 : fs2; s4; s6; g; h5 : fs2; s4; s5; g.
The running procedures of the PI-Algorithm for the example are specied as in Table 3. In
round 0, it removes all the items of preference lists of all couples that are not acceptable to
hospital jobs. After round 1 and round 2, it has actually produced the last matching. Round 3
repeats round 2 and thus the PI-Algorithm ends. We obtain the following matching.
E(c1) = (h1; h2), E(c2) = (h3; h5), E(c3) = (; ), E(c4) = (h4; ).
We can easily verify the matching obtained is stable. The matched object of c1 is the most
preferred choice and therefore there does not exist any blocking coalition containing c1. As
h1 and h2 also obtain their most preferred objects, there does not exist any blocking coalition
containing h1 or h2. Thus, possible blocking coalitions must contain fs1; h3g, fs2; h4g, fs4; h4g
or fs2; h5g. However, such blocking coalition does not exist because there is no participation
incentive for c1 and c2. Hence there does not exist any blocking coalition.
4.3 Properties of the PI-Algorithm
Suppose the PI-Algorithm ends in round T. Denote the matching produced in round t by t
and the last matching by E . Then the PI-Algorithm implies the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 T 1 = T = E; P c(t+ 1) j P c(t), X(t+ 1) j X(t) for any c 2 C, 0 < t < T .
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Table 3: Running Procedures of the PI-Algorithm
Round 0
P c1(0) = f(h1; h2); (h3; h4); (h1; ); (h3; ); (; h2); (; h4); (; )g;
P c2(0) = f(h1; h2); (h3; h5); (h1; ); (h3; ); (; h2); (; h5); (; )g;
P c3(0) = f(h1; ); (h3; ); (h5; ); (; )g;
P c4(0) = f(h2; ); (h4; ); (; )g.
0(c1) = 0(c2) = 0(c3) = 0(c4) = (; ).
Round 1
step 1 P c1(1) = P c1(0); P c2(1) = P c2(0); P c3(1) = P c3(0); P c4(1) = P c4(0).
step 2
X(1) = f(s1; h1); (s1; h3); (s2; h2); (s2; h4); (s3; h1); (s3; h3);
(s4; h2); (s4; h5); (s5; h1); (s5; h3); (s5; h5); (s6; h2); (s6; h4)g:
step 3 ChH(X(1)) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s1; h3); (s2; h4); (s4; h5)g.
step 4
ChC(ChH(X(1))) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s4; h5)g.
1(c1) = (h1; h2); 1(c2) = (; h5); 1(c3) = 1(c4) = (; ).
Round 2
step 1
P c1(2) = f(h1; h2)g; P c3(2) = P c3(1); P c4(2) = P c4(1),
P c2(2) = f(h1; h2); (h3; h5); (h1; ); (h3; ); (; h2); (; h5)g.
step 2
X(2) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h1); (s3; h3); (s4; h2); (s4; h5); (s5; h1),
(s5; h3); (s5; h5); (s6; h2); (s6; h4)g:
step 3 ChH(X(2)) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h3); (s6; h4); (s4; h5)g.
step 4
ChC(ChH(X(2))) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h3); (s6; h4); (s4; h5)g:
2(c1) = (h1; h2); 2(c2) = (h3; h5); 2(c3) = (; ); 2(c4) = (h4; ).
Round 3
step 1
P c1(3) = f(h1; h2)g, P c2(3) = f(h1; h2); (h3; h5)g,
P c3(3) = P c3(2), P c4(3) = f(h2; ); (h4; )g.
step 2
X(3) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h1); (s3; h3); (s4; h2); (s4; h5);
(s5; h1); (s5; h3); (s5; h5); (s6; h2); (s6; h4)g:
step 3 ChH(X(3)) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h3); (s6; h4); (s4; h5)g.
step 4
ChC(ChH(X(3))) = f(s1; h1); (s2; h2); (s3; h3); (s6; h4); (s4; h5)g.
Since ChC(ChH(X(3))) = ChC(ChH(X(2))), END.
E = 3 = 2:
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Lemma 4.2 t(c) c t 1(c) or t(c) = t 1(c) for all c 2 C, and t(c) c t 1(c) for some
c 2 C, 0 < t < T .
Lemma 4.2 implies that the PI-Algorithm brings a Pareto improvement in each round except
round 0 and the last round. In addition, Lemma 4.2 implies that the PI-Algorithm must end
in nite rounds, unlike the NRMP's present algorithm that may encounter an innite loop.
Suppose there exist n couples and li + 1 preferences in couple ci's preference list P
ci . Since at
least one couple gets strict improvement in each round except round 0 and the last round, the
PI-Algorithm ends after at most T =
Pn
i=1 li + 2 rounds. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 For any couples market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) with strict preferences,
the matching E obtained by running the PI-Algorithm is a stable matching on the sub-market
(C;H) where H = fh 2 H : E(h) 6= g.
In fact, the matching N found by the NRMP's present algorithm
11 is also a stable matching
on the sub-market (C;H) where C = fc 2 C : N (c) 6= (; )g.12 However, the NRMP's present
algorithm does not necessarily converge, which will encounter an innite loop when no stable
matching exists. Even so, we cannot assert that there does not exist any stable matching by
this argument because innite loop may also occur when there exist some stable matchings. In
contrast to the NRMP's present algorithm, our PI-Algorithm must end with nite rounds. The
following example shows that the NRMP's present algorithm may not converge even when there
exist some stable matchings.
Example 4.2 There is a single medical student s1, a couple c1 = (s2; s3) and two hospital jobs
h1 and h2, and their preference lists are as follows:
P s1 : fh2; h1; g;
P c1 : f(h1; h2); (h2; h1); (h1; ); (h2; ); (; h2); (; h1); (; )g;
P h1 : fs1; s2; s3; g;
11See Roth and Peranson (1999) for a detailed description of the algorithm. In order to avoid the innite loop
that may occur, Kojima et al. (2013) presented the sequential couples algorithm similar to the Roth-Peranson
algorithm, which are slightly dierent in two aspects. Firstly, where the sequential couples algorithm fails, the
Roth-Peranson algorithm proceeds and tries to nd a stable matching. Secondly, in the Roth-Peranson algorithm,
when a couple is added to the market with single doctors, any single doctor who is displaced by the couple is
placed before another couple is added. By contrast, the sequential couples algorithm holds any displaced single
doctor without letting her apply until it processes all applications by couples.
12When the NRMP's present algorithm stops at an innite loop, or when the sequential couples algorithm
ends, the matching obtained is stable if not considering the unmatched medical students. See Roth and Peranson
(1999) and Kojima et al. (2013) for details.
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P h2 : fs3; s1; s2; g.
By using the PI-Algorithm, one can quickly nd a stable matching , where (s1) = h1,
(c1) = (; h2). However, the NRMP's present algorithm will encounter an innite loop, no
matter the processing sequence starts from s1 or c1. Indeed, consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that s1 is rst processed. The tentative matching is 1 with 1(s1) = h2.
At step 2, when c1 is then processed, the algorithm results in another tentative matching 2
with 2(c1) = (h1; h2) and s1 is added to an \applicant stack". At step 3, when s1 is added
again, the algorithm gets the third tentative matching 3 with 3(s1) = h1, and c1 and h2 are
added to the \applicant stack" and \program stack", respectively. At step 4, when c1 is added
again, the algorithm gets the fourth tentative matching 4 with 4(c1) = (h2; ), and s1 is added
again to the \applicant stack" as s1 and h2 form a blocking coalition of the matching 4. At
step 5, when s1 is added again, the algorithm gets again the tentative matching 1. Continuing
step by step, it will result in an innite loop.
Case 2. Now suppose that c1 is rst processed. The algorithm will rst get the tentative
matching 2, and the later steps will be the same as those in Case 1
13.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that the market contains no real couples. Then, matching E obtained
by running the PI-Algorithm is a stable matching.
The theorem indicates that the PI-Algorithm also nds a stable matching when a matching
market only contains single medical students. It simplies the matching process of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm by accelerating the matching process in the way of Pareto improvement, and
thus is more ecient. To compare the two algorithms, we rst briey state the running process
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in Gale and Shapley (1962).
The running procedures of the Gale-Shapley algorithm that jobs rst propose to medical
students are as follows: each job h proposes to medical students of its preference list starting
from its rst choice (if it has some acceptable choices); each medical student \holds" the most
preferred job oer and rejects all others; any job rejected at some step makes a new proposal
by sequential order to the next preferred medical student who has not yet rejected it; when no
further proposals are made, the job nally accepted by medical students (if any) forms the last
matching.
As for the PI-Algorithm, in round 1, each medical student proposes to all of his or her
acceptable choices, and each job chooses its most preferred contract and sends back to the
student. The result is identical to that each job selects its most preferred student from its
13For the detailed steps of the NRMP's present algorithm, see Roth and Peranson (1999).
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preference list because its most preferred student must have proposed to it.14 As such, each
medical student's choices by the two algorithms in round 1 are identical. After round 1, the PI-
Algorithm is varied from the Gale-Shapley algorithm, as medical students do not propose to those
jobs to which they prefer their current matched objects. The procedure is that each job proposes
to medical students from more preferred to less preferred ones, but not in strict sequential order.
In other words, it will skip those medical students who will reject its proposals. Compared with
the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the PI-Algorithm obviously accelerates the matching process and
improves the eciency of algorithm. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 4.3 There are n single medical students and n+1 hospital jobs, and their preference
lists are as follows:
P s1 : fhn+1; h1; h2;   ; hn 1; hn; g;
P s2 : fh1; h2; h3;   ; hn; hn+1; g;
P s3 : fh2; h3; h4;   ; hn+1; h1; g;
   ;
P sn : fhn 1; hn; hn+1;   ; hn 3; hn 2; g;
P h1 : fs1; s3; s4;   ; sn 1; sn; s2; g;
P h2 : fs2; s4; s5;   ; ; sn; s1; s3; g;
P h3 : fs3; s5; s6;   ; s1; s2; s4; g;
   ;
P hn : fsn; s2; s3;   ; sn 2; sn 1; s1; g;
P hn+1 : fs1; g.
In round 1, both the PI-Algorithm and Gale-Shapley algorithm by which the jobs rst
propose to medical students get the matching 1, where 1(s1) = hn+1, 1(sk) = hk, for all
2  k  n. In round 2, the PI-Algorithm gets a matching 2 with 2(s1) = hn+1, 2(s2) = h1,
2(sk) = hk, for all 3  k  n. By the Gale-Shapley algorithm, however, h1 rejected by s1 in
round 1 rst proposes to s3, and sequentially to s4,   , sn. After rejected by those medical
students, h1 proposes to s2. s2 accepts h1's proposal and rejects h2. The Gale-Shapley algorithm
also gets the matching 2 after h1 sends n 1 proposals. Likewise, in round 3, the PI-Algorithm
gets a matching 3 with 3(s1) = hn+1, 3(s2) = h1, 3(s3) = h2, 3(sk) = hk, for all 4  k  n.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm also gets the matching 3 after h2 sends n 1 proposals. By round
n, the PI-Algorithm gets the last matching E = n with n(s1) = hn+1, n(sk) = hk 1, for all
14Assume that each preference of hospital jobs is acceptable to couples; otherwise, this preference cannot
be considered eective, which does not aect any individually rational matching and can be deleted from the
preference lists of hospital jobs.
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2  k  n, and thus the process ends. However, the Gale-Shapley algorithm will not get the
last matching E till n(n  1)+1 rounds. Therefore, this example shows that the PI-Algorithm
signicantly accelerates the matching process and thus is more ecient than the Gale-Shapley
algorithm.
For a singles market, similar to the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the PI-Algorithm may begin
with either proposals by medical students or proposals by jobs. That is, the PI-Algorithm can
begin from the set S to the set H, or similarly from the set H to the set S, and obtain stable
matchings ES and 
E
H
_The following theorem shows that the PI-Algorithm results in the same
matching outcomes H and S that are obtained by H-optimal and S-optimal
15 Gale-Shapley
algorithm. Thus, the PI-Algorithm can be seen as an improvement of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
which only ts the singles market.
Theorem 4.3 For any singles market   = (H;S; (h)h2H ; (s)s2S) with strict preferences,
the matchings ES and 
E
H obtained by running the PI-Algorithm are the same as H and S
obtained by H-optimal and S-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm, respectively.
5 Market Design
In the practice of matching markets, stable matching mechanisms play an important role.
However, in some special markets, theoretically there may not exist any stable matching mecha-
nism, such as roommate allocation problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and matching with couples,
etc. For matching markets with couples, if we employ semi-stable matching mechanisms, The-
orem 3.1 guarantees the existence of semi-stable matching mechanisms, and the PI-Algorithm
also ensures that semi-stable matching mechanisms are computationally feasible.
Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market, andQ = fP c1 ; P c2 ; :::; P cm; P h1 ; P h2 ; :::; P hn g
be the set of stated preference lists, one for each couple and hospital job, where each P c and P h
are couple's and job's preference lists.
Denition 5.1 A matching mechanism induced by the matching market   is a function g
whose range is the set of all possible inputs (C;H;Q) and whose output g(Q) is a matching
between C and H. If g(Q) is always stable with respect to Q, it can be called a stable matching
mechanism; if g(Q) is always semi-stable with respect to Q, it can be called a semi-stable
15H-optimal and S-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithms are respectively the algorithm that jobs rst propose to
medical students and the algorithm that students rst propose to jobs.
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matching mechanism.16
For any singles market, stable mechanisms have the following properties: 1) At every stable
matching, the set of unassigned agents is the same (cf. McVitie and Wilson (1970)); 2) There
exist weakly Pareto ecient stable matchings for one side of agents (cf. Roth (1982a)); 3)
Stable mechanisms in general are not strategy-proof (cf. Dubins and Freedman (1981), Roth
(1982, 1982a, 1985), Sonmez (1997), Martinez et al. (2004), Abdulkadiroglu (2005), Hateld and
Milgrom (2005), Klaus and Klijn (2005)). For couples markets, in general, there does not exist
a stable matching mechanism, but Theorem 3.3 guarantees the existence of a stable matching
mechanism when real couple plays reservation strategies. Also, Theorem 3.1 guarantees the
existence of a semi-stable matching mechanism.
Let E denote a semi-stable matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm following the step-
s described in the proof of Theorem 3.1, then when g(Q) = E , Theorem 3.1 ensures that
the mechanism is a semi-stable matching revelation mechanism, which is called PI-Algorithm
mechanism. For a matching market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), let F be the set of all
semi-stable matchings. Dene a correspondence K : F ! 2F by K() = f : (c) = (c) for
all c = (s; s0) 2 C with s0 6= g, i.e., the matched objects to real couples are the same at every
semi-stable matching of K().
For marriage matching markets with strict preferences, McVitie and Wilson (1970) showed
that the set of unmatched men and women is the same at every stable matching. The following
theorem generalizes the result of McVitie and Wilson (1970), which shows that for any couples
market, the subset of semi-stable matchingsK(E) coincides with the set of all stable matchings.
Theorem 5.1 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences.
Suppose that  is a semi-stable matching of  . Then, the set of unmatched medical students and
hospital jobs is the same at every semi-stable matching of K().
The next theorem shows that there exist weakly Pareto ecient semi-stable matchings for
the side of hospital jobs.
Theorem 5.2 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences.
Then, the semi-stable matching E obtained by the PI-Algorithm mechanism is weakly Pareto
ecient on K(E) for the side of hospital jobs.
16This denition follows Roth and Sotomayor (1990). A mechanism in which players must state their preferences
is called revelation mechanism in the literature.
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Theorem 5.2 implies that we have an optimal result for the side of hospital jobs in couples
markets. It then can be regarded as a generalization of the optimal theorem on marriage
matching markets in Roth (1982a). Also, by Theorem 4.3, for a singles market, K(E) coincides
with the set of stable matchings, and thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1 Let   = (H;S; (h)h2H ; (s)s2S) be a singles matching market with strict pref-
erences. Then the stable matching E obtained by running the PI-Algorithm is weakly Pareto
ecient for the side of hospital jobs.
While Theorem 5.2 shows that the PI-Algorithm mechanism results in weak Pareto optimal-
ity for hospital jobs, the following theorem, however, shows that it is not strategy-proof.
Theorem 5.3 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples matching market with strict
preferences. Then the PI-Algorithm mechanism is not strategy-proof on Q.
For any matching market with strict preferences   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), Theorem
3.2 shows that the set of semi-stable matchings forms a partition17, that is, F = [mr=1Fr, where
F is the set of all semi-stable matchings, and when m > 1, Fi \ Fj = ; for all 1  i < j  m.
Indeed, here Fis denote all dierent K()s for all  2 F . Theorem 5.2 implies that there exists,
for hospital jobs, weak Pareto optimal semi-stable matching inK(E). Let r denote the optimal
semi-stable matching for the side of hospital jobs, then Fr = K(r). Although Theorem 5.3 is a
negative result on strategy-proofness of the PI-Algorithm mechanism in the whole domain, the
following theorem is relatively positive.
Theorem 5.4 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences,
and E be the semi-stable matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm mechanism. Suppose that
the PI-Algorithm mechanism is restricted in K(E). Then it is a dominant strategy for every
hospital job to state its true preferences.
Since the singles market is a special case of the couples market, Theorem 5.4 generalizes the
results in Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982a).
In the PI-Algorithm mechanism, the outcome will be a random one among 1; 2;   ; m.
Example 5.1 below is an instance that shows the outcome is completely random. For hospital
jobs, though their welfare may be dierent among 1; 2;    ; m, they cannot anticipate which
r will be obtained by the algorithm. As such, every hospital job still has incentive to tell the
truth in the PI-Algorithm mechanism. The reason is that every r is the optimal semi-stable
17For details, see the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Appendix.
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matching in Fr for hospital jobs, and thus, when the outcomes of mechanism are restricted in
Fr, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every hospital job.
Example 5.1 Consider a matching market with two couples c1 = (s1; s2) and c2 = (s3; s4), one
single c3 = (s5; ), and four jobs of hospitals. Their rank lists of preferences are as follows:
P c1 : f(h1; h2); (h3; h1); (h3; ); (; )g; P c2 : f(h1; h2); (; h4); (; )g;
P c3 : f(h1; ); (h2; ); (; )g;
P h1 : fs3; s2; s5; g; P h2 : fs2; s4; s5; g; P h3 : fs1; g; P h4 : fs4; g:
By the PI-Algorithm mechanism, after processing PI-A1,18 we get a matching  as follows:
(c1) = (h3; ); (c2) = (; h4); (c3) = (; ).
In the process of PI-A2, if the blocking coalition fc3; (h1; )g is stochastically obtained rst,
we can get the semi-stable matching 1 with 1(c1) = (h3; ); 1(c2) = (; h4); 1(c3) = (h1; ).
In the process of PI-A2, if the blocking coalition fc3; (h2; )g is stochastically obtained rst,
we can get the semi-stable matching 2 with 2(c1) = (h3; h1); 2(c2) = (; h4); 2(c3) = (h2; ).
In the two semi-stable matchings 1 and 2, for couple c1, single c3, job h1 and job h2, their
welfare is changed.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the problem of matching with couples, which can be seen as an instance
of problems with same-side complementarity. One of the typical characteristics of such problems
is that stable outcome may not exist. To overcome this defect and provide sucient conditions
for the existence of stable matchings, we introduce the notion of semi-stable matching and
consider it as a generalized solution, which is a natural generalization of, and identical to,
the conventional stability for singles markets. It is shown that there always exists a semi-stable
matching for couples markets with strict preferences, and further the set of semi-stable matchings
can be partitioned into subsets, each of which forms a distributive lattice. When the couples
market is specialized as the singles market, semi-stable matchings of the market become stable
matchings. We also provide sucient conditions for a semi-stable matching to be stable. If the
rst preference of all real couples is one of their reservation preferences, then there exist some
stable matchings.
This result provides a perfect explanation on the puzzle of NRMP introduced by Kojima et
al. (2013). For a couples matching market, if all couples play reservation strategies, i.e., they
18For details, see the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Appendix.
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place their reservation preferences at the top of their rank order list of preferences, which is
consistent with the stylized Facts 3 and 4 of NRMP market described by Kojima et al. (2013),
then the semi-stable matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm is a stable matching. We dene the
notion of simple regular market, which simplies the regular market presented by Kojima et al.
(2013). The stylized Facts 1 and 2 imply that NRMP market satises the conditions of simple
regular market. For a sequence of simple regular couples markets, when the size of market tends
to innity, the sequence of semi-stable matchings found by the PI-Algorithm is asymptotically
stable. This also provides an interpretation for the puzzle of NRMP, which is similar to Kojima
et al. (2013).
Another remarkable contribution of the present paper is that we provide a uniform algorithm,
called the PI-Algorithm for matching with couples, which ensures nding a stable matching on
a subset of the domain that exists. Moreover, if a matching is not a semi-stable matching during
the process, the PI-Algorithm goes on processing by canceling some items from some couples'
rank lists of preferences until it converges to a semi-stable matching. In contrast to the existing
algorithms, this approach ensures nding a semi-stable matching in couples markets with strict
preferences.
Moreover, this paper studies the welfare property and incentive issues of the PI-Algorithm
mechanism from the perspective of market design. For a singles market, the results obtained by
the PI-Algorithm mechanism are the same with those of the Gale-Shapley algorithm mechanism,
while the PI-Algorithm is more ecient. For a couples market, the semi-stable matching E
obtained by the PI-Algorithm mechanism is the optimal semi-stable matching in a subset K(E)
of the set of all semi-stable matchings for the side of hospital jobs.
This paper also motivates further topics for research. For instance, what are the necessary
and sucient conditions for the semi-stable matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm mechanism
to be stable? In what matching mechanisms will players have incentives to play reservation
strategies? Another important future research is to study similar issues for couples markets
with weak preferences.
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Appendix: Proofs
Since the proofs of Theorem 3.1 and some other results need to apply Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2,
we prove them rst.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: The PI-Algorithm ends when the matching of the current round
repeats the previous round. Obviously, T 1 = T = E . The process of the PI-Algorithm
indicates that the preference list of each round is derived from the previous round by deleting a
part of elements. Deleting the items after t(c) from P
c(t+1) results in P c(t+1) j P c(t). X(t)
and X(t+1) are respectively derived from P c(t) and P c(t+1). As such, X(t+1) j X(t). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: GivenX(t) j X(t 1) by Lemma 4.1, for any h 2 H, if (s; h) 2 X(t),
we have (s; h) 2 X(t  1). Thus, if Chh(X(t  1)) = (s; h) and (s; h) 2 X(t), then we must have
Chh(X(t)) = (s; h).
Consider two cases: (1) t 1(c) = (; ). Then t(c) c t 1(c) or t(c) = t 1(c). (2)
t 1(c) = (h; h0) 6= (; ). Since (h; h0) 2 P c(t), in the round t, we have (s; h) 2 X(t) and
(s; h) 2 ChH(X(t)) if h 6= , also (s0; h0) 2 X(t) and (s0; h0) 2 ChH(X(t)) if h0 6= . Hence,
(h; h0) is selectable for c. Thus, we also have t(c) c t 1(c) or t(c) = t 1(c). When
0 < t < T , there exists some c 2 C such that t(c) c t 1(c); otherwise, the PI-Algorithm ends
before round T, which contradicts the fact that it ends in round T. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We prove the theorem by nding a semi-stable matching through
the PI-Algorithm. To do so, we rst prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.1 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences,
and the matching nally obtained by the PI-Algorithm be E. Suppose that the PI-Algorithm
ends in round T and f(s; s0); (h; h0)g is a blocking coalition of E. Then, we have (1) whenever
h 6=  and E(h) 6= s, E(h) = ; (2) whenever h0 6=  and E(h0) 6= s0, E(h0) = .
Proof: We only show statement (1), and the proof of (2) is similar. Since the PI-Algorithm
ends in round T , we have T 1 = T = E by Lemma 4.1. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that E(h) 6=  for h 6=  and E(h) 6= s. There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: h0 = . Since f(s; s0); (h; )g is a blocking coalition of E , we have s h E(h)
and (h; ) c E(c). Also, since T 1 = T = E , we have s h T 1(h) and (h; ) c
T 1(c). Then (h; ) 2 P c(T ), and thus (s; h) 2 X(T ). We then must have (s; h) =2 ChH(X(T ))
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(Otherwise, we have T (c) c (h; ) or T (c) = (h; ), which contradicts the fact that (h; ) c
E(c) = T (c).). Therefore, there exists s 6=  such that (s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )).
As such, Chh(X(T )) = (s; h). Now, if (s; h) =2 ChC(ChH(X(T ))), then T (h) = , contradicting
T (h) = E(h) 6= . Thus, we must have (s; h) 2 ChC(ChH(X(T ))), and therefore T (h) = s.
However, (s; h) =2 ChH(X(T )), and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )) implies E(h) = T (h) = s h s, which
contradicts s h E(h). Hence, we must have E(h) = .
Case 2: h0 6= . Obviously, it implies s0 6= . Since f(s; s0); (h; h0)g is a blocking coalition
of E , (h; h
0) c E(c), s h E(h) or s = E(h), s0 h0 E(h0) or s0 = E(h0). As (h; h0) c
E(c) = T 1(c), we have (h; h0) 2 P c(T ). Thus, (s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s0; h0) 2 X(T ). If
(s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )) and (s0; h0) 2 ChH(X(T )), then T (c) c (h; h0) or T (c) = (h; h0), which
contradicts (h; h0) c E(c) = T (c). Thus, either (s; h) =2 ChH(X(T )) or (s0; h0) =2 ChH(X(T )).
Without loss of generality, suppose (s; h) =2 ChH(X(T )). Then, there exists s 6=  such that
(s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )). As T (h) = E(h) 6= , T (h) = s. (s; h) =2 ChH(X(T ))
and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )) imply E(h) = T (h) = s h s, which contradicts s h E(h) or
s = E(h). Hence, we must also have E(h) = .
Thus, in either case, we have proved that whenever h 6=  and E(h) 6= s, we must have
E(h) = . Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.2 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences,
and the matching nally obtained by the PI-Algorithm be E. Suppose that for c = (s; ) 2 C,
h 2 H, fc; (h; )g is a blocking coalition of the matching E. Then there exists c = (s; s0)
with s0 6=  and h 2 H (or ~c = (~s; ~s0) with ~s 6=  and ~h 2 H) such that (h; h) c E(c) (or
(~h; h) ~c E(~c)).
Proof: Since the PI-Algorithm ends in round T , we have T 1 = T = E by Lemma 4.1.
Also, since fc; (h; )g is a blocking coalition of E , we have s h E(h) and (h; ) c E(c).
Then (h; ) c T 1(c) and (h; ) 2 P c(T ). Thus, (s; h) 2 X(T ). We then must have (s; h) =2
ChH(X(T )) (If so, T (c) c (h; ) or T (c) = (h; ), contradicting (h; ) c E(c) = T (c).).
Thus, there is s 6=  such that (s; h) 2 X(T ) with (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )).
We show that s must be a member of real couple. Suppose not. s is then a single. Let
c1 = (s; ). (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )) implies either T (c1) = (h; ) or T (c1) c1 (h; ). However,
it is impossible to have T (c1) = (h; ) (Otherwise, we have T (h) = s, which contradicts
T (h) =  by Lemma 6.1.). As such, we have T 1(c1) = T (c1) c1 (h; ), which implies
(h; ) =2 P c1(T ). Then, (s; h) =2 X(T ), contradicting (s; h) 2 X(T ). Hence, we must have s is a
member of real couple.
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If s is the rst member of a real couple, denote c = (s; s0) with s0 6= . We rst show
that (h; ) =2 P c(T ). Note that (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )) implies T (c) c (h; ) or T (c) = (h; ).
We then only have T 1(c) = T (c) c (h; ), which implies (h; ) =2 P c(T ). To see this,
suppose T (c) = (h; ). Then T (h) = s, which is impossible by noting that T (h) = . Thus
(s; h) 2 X(T ) implies the existence of h 2 H such that (h; h) 2 P c(T ), which in turn implies
(h; h) c T 1(c) = T (c) or T (c) = T 1(c) = (h; h). If T (c) = (h; h), T (h) = s, which
contradicts T (h) = . Therefore, (h; h) c T (c) = E(c).
If s is the second member of a real couple, denote ~c = (~s; ~s0) with ~s0 = s and ~s 6= . Likewise,
we can show that there exists ~h 2 H such that (~h; h) ~c E(~c). Q.E.D.
With these two lemmas, we are now ready to prove the theorem. The process of nding a
semi-stable matching by the algorithm can be divided into two stages as follows:
Process PI-A1: For any couples market with strict preferences   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c
)c2C), running the procedures of the PI-Algorithm described in Section IV, and supposing the
PI-Algorithm ends at round T , the matching nally obtained is E . If E is a semi-stable
matching, we complete the searching; otherwise we go on to the second stage.
Process PI-A2: There is a blocking coalition fc1; (h; )g of E , where c1 = (s1; ) is a single.
By Lemma 6.2, there exists c = (s; s0) with s0 6=  and h 2 H (or ~c = (~s; ~s0) with ~s 6=  and
~h 2 H) such that (h; h) c E(c) (or (~h; h) ~c E(~c)). We only consider the case of c; the case
for ~c is similar. For c, deleting all of preference job pairs before E(c) containing h from the
preference list of c, and letting P c(T +1) = P c(T ) n f(h1; h2) 2 H H : h1 = h; or; h2 = hg, the
PI-Algorithm continues on the basis of the round T . Letting the new process start from round
T + 1 to round T1, the matching obtained at the new ending is 
1
E .
We rst prove for any c 2 C, T+1(c) c T (c) or T+1(c) = T (c). In round T+1, obviously
X(T + 1)  X(T ). Then, for any eh 2 H, if T (eh) = es 6= , we have (es;eh) 2 X(T + 1), and
thus Cheh(X(T + 1)) = Cheh(X(T )) by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.2. This
implies for any ec 2 C, if T (ec) 6= (; ), T (ec) can be chosen by ec at round T + 1. Therefore,
T+1(ec) ec T (ec) or T+1(ec) = T (ec).
We then prove there is at least one c 2 C such that T+1(c) c T (c). Since fc1; (h; )g
is a blocking coalition of E , (h; ) c1 E(c1) = T (c1), (h; ) 2 P c1(T ) = P c1(T + 1), and
(s1; h) 2 X(T + 1). Suppose Chh(X(T + 1)) = (s; h). Then s h s1 or s = s1. If s = s1, then
T+1(c1) c1 (h; ) or T+1(c1) = (h; ), and thus T+1(c1) c1 T (c1); if s h s1, T (h) =
E(h) 6= s1 because fc1; (h; )g is a blocking coalition of E . Thus we have T (h) = E(h) = 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by Lemma 6.1, which implies T (s) 6= h. Chh(X(T +1)) = (s; h) implies (s; h) 2 X(T +1). For
any real couple c, we have already deleted all the preference job pairs before E(c) containing
h from the preference list of c, so s must be a single. Let c = (s; ), then (s; h) 2 X(T + 1),
which means (h; ) 2 P c(T + 1). T (s) 6= h implies T (c) 6= (h; ), and (h; ) c T (c). As
Chh(X(T + 1)) = (s; h), T+1(c) c (h; ) or T+1(c) = (h; ), and T+1(c) c T (c). Thus we
show that there exists a c 2 C such that T+1(c) c T (c).
By Lemma 4.2, for any c 2 C, 1E(c) c T+1(c) or 1E(c) = T+1(c). Thus 1E(c) c T (c)
or 1E(c) = T (c), and there exists at least one c 2 C such that 1E(c) c T (c). If 1E is a
semi-stable matching, the process ends; otherwise it goes on with PI-A2. Repeating this process,
we can get matchings 1E , 
2
E ,   , mE until there is no blocking coalition of mE , f(s; ); (h; )g.
The repetition will terminate because the terms of the preference lists of all c 2 C are nite, and
for all c 2 C, the new matching is a Pareto improvement after each repetition. As this repetition
is always in process, each single medical student will obtain his/her most preferred job, i.e., the
rst item in his/her preference list. In this case, there is no blocking coalition f(s; ); (h; )g of
mE .
Obviously, the PI-Algorithm indicates that the matchings E and 
1
E , 
2
E ,   , mE are also
individually rational. Thus we show that the matching mE nally obtained is a semi-stable
matching of the matching market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Dene a correspondence K : F ! 2F by
K() = f : (c) = (c) 8 c = (s; s0) 2 C with s0 6= g;
so that all the matchings inK() respectively match the same objects to real couples. Obviously,
F = [2FK() and further K(1) \ K(2) = ; for K(1) 6= K(2). Since such subsets are
nite, we can label them by Fi, i = 1; 2;   ;m. Then F = [mi=1Fi, and when m > 1, Fi \Fj = ;
for all 1  i < j  m. Thus, these subsets fFig constitute a partition of F . If we can show that
operations _C and ^C are closed in K(), it is easy to verify that they meet the requirements of
idempotent law, commutative law, associative law, absorption law and distributive law, and then,
by the denition of distributive lattice,19 K() constitutes a distributive lattice for operations
_C and ^C . Consequently, the theorem is proved.
To show that operations _C and ^C are indeed closed in K(), i.e.,  = 1 _C 2 2 K()
19From Birkho and Mac Lane (2007), a lattice is a set L of elements with two binary operations ^ and _ which
are idempotent, commutative, and associative and which satisfy the absorption law. If in addition the distributive
law holds, L is called a distributive lattice.
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and  = 1 ^C 2 2 K(), consider any c = (s; s0) 2 C. If s0 6= , by the denition of
K(), 1(c) = 2(c), thus (c) = (c) = 1(c) = 2(c); if s
0 = , when 1(c) = 2(c),
(c) = (c) = 1(c) = 2(c); when 1(c) c 2(c), (c) = 1(c) and (c) = 2(c); when
2(c) c 1(c), (c) = 2(c) and (c) = 1(c).
We now show that  2 K(). We rst prove  is a matching. To do so, we need to show
that for any c1 2 C, c2 2 C, c1 6= c2, we have (1) (s1) 6= (s2) for (s1) 6=  and (s2) 6= , (2)
(s01) 6= (s02) for (s01) 6=  and (s02) 6= , (3) (s01) 6= (s2) for (s01) 6=  and (s2) 6= , and
(4) (s1) 6= (s02) for (s1) 6=  and (s02) 6= .
(1) (s1) 6= (s2). Suppose not. There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: s01 6=  or s02 6= . Without loss of generality, suppose s01 6= .
Since (c1) = 1(c1) = 2(c1), (s1) = 1(s1) = 2(s1). If (c2) = 1(c2), (s2) = 1(s2),
then 1(s1) = (s1) = (s2) = 1(s2), which contradicts that 1 is a matching; if (c2) = 2(c2),
(s2) = 2(s2), then 2(s1) = 2(s2), which contradicts that 2 is a matching.
Case 2: s01 =  and s02 = .
Case A: (c1) = 1(c1) and (c2) = 1(c2). It implies (s1) = 1(s1) and (s2) = 1(s2).
Then, 1(s1) = 1(s2), which contradicts that 1 is a matching.
Case B: (c1) = 2(c1) and (c2) = 2(c2). It implies (s1) = 2(s1) and (s2) = 2(s2).
Then, 2(s1) = 2(s2), which contradicts that 2 is a matching.
Case C: (c1) = 1(c1) and (c2) = 2(c2). It implies (s1) = 1(s1) and (s2) = 2(s2).
Then, 1(s1) = 2(s2). Let h = 1(s1) = 2(s2), 1(h) = s1 and 2(h) = s2. Since s
0
1 = 
and s02 = , 1(c1) = (h; ) and 2(c2) = (h; ). (c1) = 1(c1) and (c2) = 2(c2) respectively
imply that (h; ) = 1(c1) c1 2(c1) and (h; ) = 2(c2) c2 1(c2). c1 6= c2 implies s1 6= s2.
Therefore, if s1 h s2, fc1; (h; )g is a blocking coalition of 2, which contradicts that 2 is a
semi-stable matching; if s2 h s1, fc2; (h; )g is a blocking coalition of 1, which contradicts
that 1 is a semi-stable matching.
Case D: (c1) = 2(c1) and (c2) = 1(c2). It can also be proved by the same argument of
Case C.
Thus, by Case 1 and Case 2, if c1 6= c2, we must have (s1) 6= (s2) for (s1) 6=  and
(s2) 6= .
(2) (s01) 6= (s02). As (s01) 6=  and (s02) 6= , we have s01 6=  and s02 6= , and thus
(c1) = 1(c1) = 2(c1) and (c2) = 1(c2) = 2(c2). Since c1 6= c2 implies 1(s01) 6= 1(s02),
(s01) 6= (s02).
(3) (s01) 6= (s2). Since (s01) 6=  implies s01 6= , (c1) = 1(c1) = 2(c1). Also, c1 6= c2
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implies 1(s
0
1) 6= 1(s2) and 2(s01) 6= 2(s2), but (s01) = 1(s01) = 2(s01) and (s2) = 1(s2)
or 2(s2). Thus (s
0
1) 6= (s2).
(4) (s1) 6= (s02). The proof is similar to that of (3).
Therefore, for all c1; c2 2 C with c1 6= c2, we have (s1) 6= (s2) for (s1) 6=  and (s2) 6= ;
(s01) 6= (s02) for (s01) 6=  and (s02) 6= ; (s1) 6= (s02) for (s1) 6=  and (s02) 6= ;
(s01) 6= (s2) for (s01) 6=  and (s2) 6= . Hence  = 1 _C 2 is a matching.
Next, we prove  = 1 _C 2 is a semi-stable matching.
Let C = C1 [ C2, where s01 =  for all c1 2 C1 and s02 6=  for all c2 2 C2. Obviously,
C1 \ C2 = ;. Let HC() = fh 2 H : there exists c2 2 C2 such that (h) = s2 or (h) = s02g.
For any  2 K(), let e denote a restricted matching on (C1; [H nHC()]), where e(c1) = (c1)
for all c1 2 C1. Since  is a semi-stable matching, e is a stable matching. Otherwise, there exists
a blocking coalition fc1; (h1; )g of e, and obviously fc1; (h1; )g is also a blocking coalition of
, which contradicts that  is a semi-stable matching.
For any 1 2 K() and 2 2 K(), e1 and e2 are stable matchings on (C1; [H n HC()]).
By Conway's lattice theorem for singles markets, e = e1 _C e2 is also a stable matching on
(C1; [H nHC()]). Therefore,  = 1 _C 2 must be a semi-stable matching. Otherwise, there
exists a blocking coalition fc1; (h; )g of , where c1 2 C1. If h 2 [H n HC()], fc1; (h; )g
must be a blocking coalition of e, which contradicts that e is a stable matching; if h 2 HC(),
(h) = 1(h) = 2(h). We have (c1) = 1(c1) or (c1) = 2(c1), and fc1; (h; )g is a blocking
coalition of  implies s1 h (h) and (h; ) c1 (c1). Therefore, fc1; (h; )g is a blocking
coalition of 1 or 2, which contradicts that 1 and 2 are semi-stable matchings. Therefore,
 = 1 _C 2 must be a semi-stable matching. Thus  = 1 _C 2 2 K(). Similarly, we can
prove that  = 1 ^C 2 2 K(). Thus, the theorem is proved. Q.E.D.
Remark: Suppose that there are m semi-stable matchings in K(). Then we can easily
see that C  1 _C 2 _C    _C m and H  1 ^C 2 ^C    ^C m are respectively the
best and worst semi-stable matching for the couples. Indeed, if c 2 C2 or h 2 HC(), then
(c) = C(c) = H(c) and (h) = C(h) = H(h) for all  2 K(). For any  2 K(), let e
denote a restricted matching on (C1; [H nHC()]), where e(c1) = (c1) for all c1 2 C1. Since 
is a semi-stable matching, e is a stable matching. By the conclusion of the marriage matching
market (Knuth, 1976; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), we have e H fC and e H fH . Thus,
 H C and  H H for all  2 K(). Hence, C and H are respectively the worst and
best semi-stable matching for the hospital jobs in K().
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Proof of Theorem 3.3: Let the matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm be E . We show
it must be a stable matching if every real couple c's rst preference job pair (h; h0) in P c is a
reservation preference job pair of c. Obviously, the PI-Algorithm implies that E must be an
individually rational matching. We rst show E(c) = (h; h
0) for any c 2 C with s0 6= . Indeed,
at round 1 of the PI-Algorithm, the rst job pair (h; h0) in P c is c's reservation preference job
pair. If h 6= , then (s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )); if h0 6= , then (s0; h0) 2 X(T ) and
(s0; h0) 2 ChH(X(T )). Thus, (h; h0) is selectable for c, and it is the rst item of P c. Therefore,
1(c) = (h; h
0). By Lemma 4.2, E(c) c 1(c) = (h; h0) or E(c) = 1(c). As (h; h0) is the rst
item of P c, (h; h0) c E(c) or (h; h0) = E(c). As such, we must have E(c) = (h; h0).
We then show that E is stable. If not, there exists at least one blocking coalition fc1; (h1; h01)g
with c1 = (s1; s
0
1). If s
0
1 6= , (h1; h01) c E(c1), which contradicts that E(c1) equals to the
rst preference of c1. If s
0
1 = , then by Lemma 6.2, there exists c = (s; s
0) with s0 6=  and
h 2 H (or ~c = (~s; ~s0) with ~s 6=  and ~h 2 H) such that (h1; h) c E(c) (or (~h; h1) ~c E(~c)),
which also contradicts that E(c) (or E(~c)) equals to the rst preference of c (or ~c). Thus, E
must be stable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.4: By Theorem 3.1, for any k = 1; 2; : : :, there is a semi-stable
matching kE in market  
k. By the denition of semi-stable matching, any blocking coalition
fc; (h; h0)g of kE contains a real couple c = (s; s0), and (h; h0) must be its eective prefer-
ence. By Condition 2 for simple regularity, the number of blocking coalitions of kE must be
less than mk  (lnnk). For the null matching 0, the number of its blocking coalitions is
N =
P
c2Ck lc. By Condition 3 for simple regularity, we have N  nk. Thus, the instability
degree is (kE) = m=N  mk  (lnnk)=nk. By Condition 1 for simple regularity, mk  nk1 ,
and we have (kE)  (lnnk)=nk. Thus limnk!1 (kE) = 0, that is, as nk tends to innity,
the sequence of instability degree f(kE)g1k=1 tends to zero. Therefore, the matching sequence
fkEg1k=1 is asymptotically stable, that is, f kg1k=1 is asymptotically stable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.5: Let the semi-stable matching obtained by the algorithm described
in Section IV be E . We need to show that E is a stable matching. It is clear that the PI-
Algorithm indicates that E must be individually rational.
We rst show that for any c 2 C with s0 6= , E(c) = (h; h0). Indeed, at round 1 of the
PI-Algorithm, (h; h0) is c's reservation preference job pair, which implies that if h 6= , then
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(s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )); if h0 6= , then (s0; h0) 2 X(T ) and (s0; h0) 2 ChH(X(T )).
Thus, (h; h0) is selectable for c at round 1, and 1(c) c (h; h0) or 1(c) = (h; h0).
We now show 1(c) = (h; h
0). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that 1(c) 6= (h; h0).
Then we must have 1(c) = (h; h
0
) c (h; h0). Thus, (h; ) 6= (; ) or (h0; ) 6= (; ) implies
that it is not only a reservation preference term but also the rst preference term of a single.
Therefore, if h 6= , there exists c = (s; ) such that (s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )), and
1(c) = (h; ) because (h; ) is the rst preference term of c; if h
0 6= , there exists ec = (es; )
such that (es; h0) 2 X(T ) and (es; h0) 2 ChH(X(T )), and 1(ec) = (h0; ) because (h0; ) is the
rst preference term of ec. This contradicts 1(c) = (h; h0). Hence 1(c) = (h; h0).
For any preference (h; h
0
) of c before (h; h0), if h 6= , there exists c = (s; ) such that
1(c) = (h; ). The process of the PI-Algorithm for nding semi-stable matching E implies
that E(c) c 1(c) for any c 2 C. However, since (h; ) is the rst preference term of c,
E(c) = (h; ). Likewise, if h
0 6= , there exists ec = (es; ) such that E(ec) = (h0; ). Thus
E(c) = 1(c) = (h; h
0) by noting that it cannot be matched to an object which is better than
(h; h0) for c.
Now, if the semi-stable matching E is not a stable matching, there exists at least one
blocking coalition fc1; (h1; h01)g with s01 6= . As such, we have (h1; h01) c E(c1). Moreover,
s1 h1 E(h1) if h1 6= , and s01 h01 E(h01) if h01 6= . However, as shown above, if h1 6= ,
then there exists c1 = (s1; ) such that E(c1) = (h1; ), which contradicts s1 h1 E(h1) = s1
by noting that (h1; ) is a reservation preference term of c1 implies that s1 h1 s1; if h01 6= ,
then there exists ec1 = (es1; ) such that 1(ec1) = (h01; ), which contradicts s01 h01 E(h01) = es1
by noting that (h01; ) is a reservation preference term of ec1 implies that es1 h01 s01. Thus E
must be a stable matching. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: It is clear that the PI-Algorithm implies the matching E is
an individually rational matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that E is not a stable
matching. Then there exists a blocking coalition f(s; s0); (h; h0)g with E(h) 6=  and E(h0) 6= .
However, by Lemma 6.1, E(h) =  = E(h
0) when h 6= , E(h) 6= s, h0 6= , E(h0) 6= s0.
As such, E(h) 6=  and E(h0) 6=  imply E(h) = s and E(h0) = s0, which contradicts that
f(s; s0); (h; h0)g is a blocking coalition of E . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Again, the PI-Algorithm clearly implies that the matching E
must be an individually rational matching. Suppose that E is not a stable matching, there
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exists at least one blocking coalition f(s; s0); (h; )g of E . By Lemma 6.2, there exists c = (s; s0)
with s0 6=  and h 2 H (or ~c = (~s; ~s0) with ~s 6=  and ~h 2 H) such that (h; h) c E(c) (or
(~h; h) ~c E(~c)), which contradicts that   has no real couples. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: For any singles market   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C), the
subset K(ES ) of the set of semi-stable matchings is identical to the set of stable matchings. By
Theorem 5.2, the matching ES is the optimal stable matching for the side of hospital jobs. The
optimal theorem of marriage matching markets (Roth, 1982a) implies that H is the optimal
stable matching for the side of hospital jobs. Since the optimal matching is unique, we have
ES = H . For any singles market, 
E
H and 
E
S are logically symmetrical. Likewise, we have
EH = S . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Since matched object of each real couple is the same for all semi-
stable matchings in K(), the set of unmatched real couples is the same at every semi-stable
matching in K(). After excluding all real couples and their matched objects, the semi-stable
matching is actually a stable matching for singles and all remaining jobs of hospitals. By M-
cVitie and Wilson theorem, the set of unmatched single medical students and remaining jobs of
hospitals is the same for every stable matching. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5.2: To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.3 Let   = (H;S;C; (h)h2H ; (c)c2C) be a couples market with strict preferences,
and the outcome obtained by the PI-Algorithm mechanism be E. Suppose that for every  2
K(E), there exists h 2 H such that s = (h) h E(h). Then s must be a single, h1 = E(s) 6=
, and (h1) h1 E(h1).
Proof: Since  and E are semi-stable matchings, they are both individually rational, and
E(h) h  or E(h) = . Since s = (h) h E(h), s = (h) h , which implies (s) = h 6=
. By Theorem 5.1, the set of unmatched medical students is the same for every semi-stable
matching in K(E), which implies that the set of matched medical students is also the same
for every semi-stable matching in K(E). Thus, h1 = 
E((h)) = E(s) 6= , s = E(h1).
Let s1 = (h1), then (h) h E(h) implies s = (h) 6= E(h). Thus h1 = E(s) 6= h, and
s1 = (h1) 6= (h) = s. We show s must be a single. If not, s is a member of a real couple c,
then (c) = E(c) because  2 K(E). Thus h = (s) = E(s) = h1, contradicting h1 6= h.
Next, we show that h1 s h = (s).
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Since  and E are individually rational and h1 6=  6= h, we have h1 = E(s) s 
and h = (s) s . Thus, at step 1 of round 1 in the process of the PI-Algorithm, we have
(s; h) 2 X(1) and (s; h1) 2 X(1). Noting that the PI-Algorithm ends at round T and letting
s = E(h), we have (s; h) 2 X(T ) and (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )). Since s = (h) h E(h) = s;
we have (s; h) =2 X(T ); otherwise, it contradicts (s; h) 2 ChH(X(T )). Since (s; h) =2 X(T ),
by Lemma 4.1 ,we have h1 = 
E(s) = T 1(s) s h, where T 1 is the temporary matching
obtained at round T-1.
If s h1 s1 = (h1), as h1 s h = (s), f(s; ); (h1; )g constitutes a blocking coalition of
matching , which contradicts that  is a semi-stable matching. Hence (h1) = s1 h1 s =
E(h1). Q.E.D.
Now we begin to prove the theorem. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that E is not weakly
Pareto ecient on K(E) for the side of hospital jobs, then there exists a matching  2 K(E)
such that for all h 2 H, (h) h E(h) or (h) = E(h), and there exists an h 2 H such
that (h) h E(h) . Let s1 = (h) and h1 = E(s1). By Lemma 6.3, s1 must be a single,
h1 6=  and (h1) h1 E(h1). Repeatedly applying Lemma 6.3, we can obtain two sequences,
one is the sequence of medical students fs1; s2;    g, and the other is the sequence of hospital
jobs fh1; h2; : : : ; g, where sk+1 = (hk) and hk = E(sk) for any k > 0. Due to the limited
number of medical students, there exists the least k and r such that sk+r = sk. Thus k = 1;
otherwise hk+r 1 = (sk) = hk 1 and sk+r 1 = E(hk 1) = sk 1, which contradicts that k is
the least. Therefore, k = 1, that is, s1 = sr+1 and h0 = hr. It is easy to deduce that sl = sl+r
and hl = hl+r for any l > 0. Thus, we obtain twin circulating sequences: the sequence of
medical students fs1; s2;    ; srg and the sequence of hospital jobs fh1; h2;    ; hrg, such that
sk+1 = (hk), hk = 
E(sk) and sk+1 hk sk for any k > 0. We now show that there are no such
twin circulating sequences. As a result, the theorem is proved.
Denote by H  H the set of all jobs satisfying the condition (h) h E(h). We consider
two cases.
Case 1: H = fh1; h2;    ; hrg. For any 2  k  r+1,  and E are both semi-stable match-
ings, which implies that they are both individually rational, and thus hk = 
E(sk) sk  and
hk 1 = E(sk 1) sk 1 . At the step 1 of round 1 in the process of the PI-Algorithm, (sk; hk) 2
X(1) and (sk 1; hk 1) 2 X(1). Suppose the PI-Algorithm ends at round T and gives the tem-
porary matching t at round t, since hk 1 = E(sk 1) = T (sk 1), we have (sk 1; hk 1) 2
X(T ) and (sk 1; hk 1) 2 ChH(X(T )). Also, since sk = (hk 1) hk 1 E(hk 1) = sk 1,
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(sk; hk 1) =2 X(T ) (Otherwise, it contradicts (sk 1; hk 1) 2 ChH(X(T )).). Thus, (sk; hk 1) 2
X(1) and (sk; hk 1) =2 X(T ) imply that there exists 1 < tk < T such that (sk; hk 1) 2 X(tk)
and (sk; hk 1) =2 X(tk + 1). Without loss of generality, suppose tk is the least one. Then
h  tk(sk) sk hk 1 = (sk). Thus we must have h =2 H. Indeed, suppose not. Then
tk(sk) = h = hj = 
E(sj). As such, (sj ; hj) 2 ChH(X(tk)) and (sj+1; hj) =2 X(tk) by noting
that sj+1 = (hj) hj E(hj) = sj . Also, (sj+1; hj) 2 X(1) by noting that sj+1 hj sj hj .
Thus, there exists tj such that (sj+1; hj) 2 X(tj) and (sj+1; hj) 62 X(tj + 1). We then have
tj < tk because (sj+1; hj) 2 X(tj) and (sj+1; hj) 62 X(tk), which contradicts the hypothesis that
tk is the least. So h =2 H.
Let s = (h). Then s 6= . Suppose not. Since h = tk(sk) sk hk 1 = (sk), sk h  and
sk is a single, f(sk; ); (h; )g forms a blocking coalition of matching , which contradicts the
fact that  is a semi-stable matching. So we must have s 6= . Then, by Theorem 5.1, we havees  E(h) 6= . Therefore, s, es and sk are all acceptable medical students for h. Since h has
chosen sk before the nal matching es, we have sk h es. If es h s or es = s, then sk h s = (h).
Consequently, f(sk; ); (h; )g is a blocking coalition of the matching , which contradicts that
 is a semi-stable matching. Thus s h es, that is, (h) h E(h), and h 2 H. However, this
contradicts h =2 H. Hence E must be an optimal semi-stable matching in K(E) for the side
of hospital jobs when H = fh1; h2;    ; hrg.
Case 2: H 6= fh1; h2;   ; hrg. By repeating the above proof, we can obtain the circulat-
ing sequence of medical students fs1; s2;    ; srg and the circulating sequence of hospital jobs
fh1; h2;    ; hrg such that sk+1 = (hk), hk = E(sk) and sk+1 hk sk for any k > 0. The pre-
requisite of twin circulating sequences is that there exists at least one h =2 fh1; h2;    ; hrg such
that (h) h E(h). Applying Lemma 6.3 again, we obtain another twin circulating sequences
satisfying the same conditions. By repeating the proving process in Case 1, the prerequisite of
this new twin circulating sequences is another new twin circulating sequences, and it similarly
shows that these dierent twin circulating sequences do not intersect with each other. The same
argument can be repeated endlessly, thus we can obtain innite twin circulating sequences. S-
ince H is a nite set, all these twin circulating sequences are bound to constitute a causal circle,
that is, the prerequisite of the rst twin circulating sequences is the existence of the second twin
circulating sequences, and the prerequisite of the second twin circulating sequences is the exis-
tence of the third twin circulating sequences, and so on, which leads to a contradiction. Thus,
E must be a weakly Pareto ecient semi-stable matching in K(E) for the side of hospital jobs
when H 6= fh1; h2;    ; hrg. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3: To prove the theorem, it is sucient to demonstrate some matching
markets in which truth-telling is not the best response for some agent even though all others
state their preferences truthfully.
Consider a matching market with one couple c1 = (s1; s2) and one single c2 = (s3; ), and
four jobs of hospitals. Their rank lists of preferences are as follows:
P c1 : f(h1; h2); (h2; h1); (h3; ); (; )g; P c2 : f(h1; ); (h4; ); (h2; ); (; )g;
P h1 : fs2; s1; s3; g; P h2 : fs3; s1; s2; g; P h3 : fs1; g; P h4 : fs3; g:
After processing PI-A1 in the PI-Algorithm mechanism, we get a matching  with (c1) =
(h3; ) and (c2) = (h4; ). fc2; (h1; )g is the only blocking coalition containing a single. Thus,
after deleting the preference containing h1 in P
c1 , in the process of PI-A2, we get a semi-stable
matching 1 with 1(c1) = (h3; ) and 1(c2) = (h1; ) by continuing the PI-Algorithm.
Suppose that all others state their true preferences. Then, c1 can be better o by manipulat-
ing their own preferences through reporting P
0c1 : f(h1; h2); (; )g. As such, we obtain another
semi-stable matching 2 with 2(c1) = (h1; h2) and 2(c2) = (h4; ) by the PI-Algorithm mech-
anism, and thus 2(c1) = (h1; h2) c1 (h3; ) = 1(c1). Therefore, the PI-Algorithm mechanism
is not strategy-proof.
We can also provide an example of market in which a job has incentive not to state its true
preferences. To see this, consider another matching market with two couples c1 = (s1; s2) and
c2 = (s3; s4), and four jobs of hospitals. Their rank lists of preferences are as follows:
P c1 : f(h1; h2); (h3; ); (; )g; P c2 : f(h1; h2); (h4; ); (; )g;
P h1 : fs1; s3; g; P h2 : fs4; s2; g; P h3 : fs1; g; P h4 : fs3; g:
After processing PI-A1 in the PI-Algorithm mechanism, we get a semi-stable matching 1
with 1(c1) = (h3; ) and 1(c2) = (h4; ).
Suppose that all others state their true preferences. h1 then can be better o by manip-
ulating its own preferences through reporting P
0h1 : fs3; g. After processing PI-A1 in the
PI-Algorithm mechanism, we get another semi-stable matching 2 with 2(c1) = (h3; ) and
2(c2) = (h1; h2). 2(h1) = s3 h1  = 1(h1). Again, this shows the PI-Algorithm mechanism
is not strategy-proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: Since matched objects of real couples are the same for every
semi-stable matching in K(E), the welfare is unchanged for all real couples and their matched
jobs. Thus, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all real couples and their matched jobs. After
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excluding all real couples and their matched objects, the semi-stable matching is actually a stable
matching for all singles and remaining hospital jobs. By Theorem 4.3, for any matching market
containing only singles with strict preferences, the matching obtained by the PI-Algorithm is
identical to H which is obtained by jobs optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm. By the dominant
strategy theorem on marriage matching markets in Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth
(1982a), telling the truth is a dominant strategy for each remaining job of hospitals. Q.E.D.
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